WB-CCMS

WB-CCMS — Comprehensive Cable Monitoring System

Monitor power cables before damage occurs

Copper theft, sabotage and ageing put cable routes along railway lines and in energy facilities at risk. WB-CCMS monitors the electrical values on a standards-based approach and additionally evaluates the available data using AI. Anomalies along the entire cable route are detected in real time.

WB-CCMS Systemarchitektur

On-site technicians

Sensors requiring no calibration, clear alarm signals in the event of a communication failure rather than silent malfunctions, and guided maintenance via the service kit.

System & Architecture ↓

IT managers

Separate roles for the raw-value sensor and the secure evaluation unit; a logged update channel instead of a smartphone app; a documented attack surface.

Security architecture ↓

Decision-makers

A cost-effective alternative to fencing and security guards; classification under the KRITIS umbrella legislation and NIS2 obligations.

Regulatory environment ↓


Cable routes are unprotected stretches, kilometres long, that are vulnerable to attack

The theft of non-ferrous metals, deliberate sabotage and simple wear and tear all affect the same infrastructure — and, at first glance, appear identical on an unguarded section of track. Without surveillance along the entire route, the difference often only becomes apparent after several days.

€34 million

Total losses due to cable and metal theft in the same period last year

For more information, see “Vandalism causes over 30 million euros’ worth of damage to the rail network”

€5.5 million

of which solely due to the theft of non-ferrous metals

For more information, see “Vandalism causes over 30 million euros’ worth of damage to the rail network”

Arson attack on electricity pylons

Around 20,000 households affected. An incident involving visible, above-ground infrastructure — in the case of underground cable routes, this visibility is completely absent.

Five 110-kV and ten 10-kV cables destroyed

Around 100,000 people affected, four days without power — according to consistent reports, the longest power cut in Berlin’s post-war history.

Initial assessment ≠ outcome of the investigation (June 2024)

On 8 October 2022, two redundant fibre-optic cables near Herne and Berlin-Karow were deliberately and co-ordinatedly cut. Rail services in Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein were disrupted for around three hours, the Berlin–Amsterdam service was suspended, and thousands of passengers were left stranded.

Initial assessment: Due to the coordinated nature of the operation, it has initially been classified as a targeted attack or act of sabotage (Section 88 of the German Criminal Code) — a matter that has also been the subject of intense political debate.

Findings of the investigation (June 2024): The Bochum Public Prosecutor’s Office identified two suspects acting independently of one another. The coincidence in timing was purely coincidental — the perpetrators were actually looking for copper cables and did not recognise the fibre-optic cables, which had in fact been cut, as such. Final classification: Theft in conjunction with endangering rail traffic — no political motive.

Sources cited: ARD, SWR, Tagesschau, Der Spiegel; as a summary

Last year, Deutsche Bahn suffered damage amounting to 34 million euros as a result of vandalism.

Of this, 19.6 million euros was spent on infrastructure, according to a response from the Federal Ministry of Transport to a written question from the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag.
According to the report, the theft of non-ferrous metals cost 5.5 million euros, whilst the removal of graffiti from railway facilities cost 3.7 million euros. In addition, a total of 6.8 million euros was recorded under the category of vandalism.

Quellen
Handelsblatt: Vandalismusschäden von über 30 Millionen Euro bei der Bahn
Rhein-Zeitung: Vandalismusschäden von über 30 Millionen Euro bei der Bahn
Aachener Zeitung: Vandalismusschäden von über 30 Millionen Euro bei der Bahn
Bietigheimer Zeitung: Vandalismusschäden von über 30 Millionen Euro bei der Bahn


Fences and security measures do not scale. Physical security measures covering hundreds of kilometres of track are labour-intensive and costly. Continuous sensor monitoring along the route is the economically viable alternative — and, as the chapter on regulatory requirements below shows, is increasingly required by law.

A modular system architecture — from basic protection to AI-powered pattern recognition

WB-CCMS is based on tried-and-tested WITT components (WB-CM3, WB-CM4) and expands upon them with distributed sensor technology and optional analysis methods. The three stages can be used independently and can be retrofitted in stages.

BASIS

WB-CM7 NG — enclosed evaluation unit

The electrical core of the system: a securely housed unit that analyses measurement data and triggers alarms. It is deliberately separated from the field sensors, so that a compromised sensor cannot gain access to the analysis logic.

EXTENSION

WB-CSN — up to 256 remote sensors

Distributed sensor nodes spaced up to 300 metres apart along the route, silicon-based with no moving parts — maintenance- and calibration-free. Each sensor provides raw measurement data only; the data is evaluated centrally by the WB-CM7 NG.

  • Bidirectional communication via the OpenCAN bus with a running watchdog function
  • Alarm in the event of a communication failure — Silence is not interpreted as the normal state
  • Security settings can be configured on a project-by-project basis

OPTION

WB-CM 7 AI module for complex analysis cases

In the early stages of research, in collaboration with the Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits (IIS) in Dresden. Training is carried out in stages through ‘real-world laboratory’ partnerships with energy plant operators.

For IT managers: separate roles, documented update procedures

A cable monitoring system is itself a potential target for attack. WB-CCMS is designed in such a way that a single compromised point does not jeopardise the entire system.

Role separation rather than an all-round sensor

The WB-CSN sensors record raw data only and do not make any safety-related decisions themselves. Evaluation, alarm logic and configuration are handled exclusively by the securely housed
WB-CM7 NG or WB-CM 7 KI.

Sensor (WB-CSN) → Rohwert only → OpenCAN, bidirektional
Auswertung (WB-CM7 NG) → geschützt untergebracht → Alarmlogik, Konfiguration

Sensor aktiv → Status OK
Sensor still → Alarm
(kein Alarm ≠ Normalzustand wird angenommen)

A watchdog rather than relying on silence

The connection between the sensor and the evaluation unit is continuously monitored. If communication is lost, the system triggers an alarm rather than treating the failure as insignificant.

A service kit instead of a smartphone app

Configuration and updates are carried out via a dedicated, fully logged service package — a deliberate decision not to use a smartphone as an update channel, in view of the update obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA).

Update-Kanal: Servicekoffer → dediziertes Gerät → vollständig geloggt → CRA-orientierte Auslegung

The KRITIS framework law and NIS2 make physical protection a specific obligation

La loi de transposition de la directive NIS2 est en vigueur depuis le 5 décembre 2025, et la loi-cadre KRITIS depuis le 16 mars 2026 [vérifier les dates avant publication]. Ces deux cadres réglementaires mettent également l’accent sur la sécurité physique des infrastructures énergétiques et ferroviaires.

Section of the ActTitleBrief description
KRITIS-DachG Section 12Obligation to carry out a risk analysisOperators of critical infrastructure must systematically assess the risks to their infrastructure — including physical attacks on cable routes.
KRITIS-DachG § 13Physical protectionProperty security, access control and surveillance are explicitly identified as security measures.
KRITIS-DachG § 18 / NIS2UmsuCG § 32Short notification deadlinesReporting requirements ranging from 24 hours to one month after an incident call for reliable, timely data.

Whether, and to what extent, a specific installation falls within the scope of the KRITIS framework law or the NIS2 thresholds depends on the individual case and is, in some respects, still subject to pending regulations. We will work with you to organise this for your specific system.


Experience in the railway industry since 1972

WITT Solutions is developing WB-CCMS in collaboration with operators, industry partners and the Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits (IIS) in Dresden [to be approved for publication]. The system builds on existing WITT products and is supplemented by newly developed components.

  • 1972: WITT Solutions was founded.
  • 1982: Supplier to the local passenger rail transport sector (LRPT) ever since.
  • Heute: Entwicklung von Bahnstrom 4.0 Komponenten und Systemlösungen

Fraunhofer IIS, Dresden

Research partners for the AI module and its phased training.

Energy plant operators

Real-world laboratory partnerships provide training and validation data from day-to-day operations.

Industry partners

Joint further development of standard components and system integration.

Let’s talk about your investment

This page outlines the approach — we will discuss directly with you to determine which configuration, security level and regulatory classification are best suited to your specific route.

WITT Solutions — Traction Power 4.0